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I was previously a constitutional law and civil rights litigator and am now a journalist. I am the author of three New York Times bestselling books -- "How Would a Patriot Act" (a critique of Bush executive power theories), "Tragic Legacy" (documenting the Bush legacy), and With Liberty and Justice for Some (critiquing America's two-tiered justice system and the collapse of the rule of law for its political and financial elites). My fifth book - No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the US Surveillance State - will be released on April 29, 2014 by Holt/Metropolitan.

Friday, December 01, 2006

Tom Friedman's pre-war advocacy for the invasion

Beginning in November, 2002 all the way up until and including the day of the invasion -- March 23, 2003 -- Tom Friedman essentially made every single argument about the war, including many that conflicted with one another, except for one -- we should not invade Iraq. But on the day of the invasion, he mocked the argument of "the French," whose views he said were "unserious" and should result in their removal from the U.N. Security Council ( specifically, "the French argue that only bad things will come from this war -- more terrorism, a dangerous precedent for preventive war, civilian casualties").

And despite having repeatedly said that the Bush administration's pre-war actions were disastrous, Friedman declared on March 23 that the war would produce the outcome the Bush administration argued would result and that The Dreaded Unserious French would be proven wrong:

January 26, 2003

My gut tells me we should continue the troop buildup, continue the inspections and do everything we can for as long as we can to produce either a coup or the sort of evidence that will give us the broadest coalition possible, so we can do the best nation-building job possible.

But if war turns out to be the only option, then war it will have to be -- because I believe that our kids will have a better chance of growing up in a safer world if we help put Iraq on a more progressive path and stimulate some real change in an Arab world that is badly in need of reform. Such a war would indeed be a shock to this region, but, if we do it right, there is a decent chance that it would be shock therapy.

January 22, 2003

What liberals fail to recognize is that regime change in Iraq is not some distraction from the war on Al Qaeda. That is a bogus argument. And simply because oil is also at stake in Iraq doesn't make it illegitimate either. Some things are right to do, even if Big Oil benefits.

Although President Bush has cast the war in Iraq as being about disarmament -- and that is
legitimate -- disarmament is not the most important prize there. Regime change is the prize. Regime transformation in Iraq could make a valuable contribution to the war on terrorism, whether Saddam is ousted or enticed into exile. . . .

It is not unreasonable to believe that if the U.S. removed Saddam and helped Iraqis build not an overnight democracy but a more accountable, progressive and democratizing regime, it would have a positive, transforming effect on the entire Arab world -- a region desperately in need of a progressive model that works. . . .

This is something liberals should care about -- because liberating the captive peoples of the Mideast is a virtue in itself and because in today's globalized world, if you don't visit a bad neighborhood, it will visit you.

January 26, 2003

If and when we take the lid off Iraq, we will find an envelope inside. It will tell us what we have won and it will say one of two things.

It could say, ''Congratulations! You've just won the Arab Germany -- a country with enormous human talent, enormous natural resources, but with an evil dictator, whom you've just removed. Now, just add a little water, a spoonful of democracy and stir, and this will be a normal nation very soon.''

Or the envelope could say, ''You've just won the Arab Yugoslavia -- an artificial country congenitally divided among Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, Nasserites, leftists and a host of tribes and clans that can only be held together with a Saddam-like iron fist. Congratulations, you're the new Saddam.'' . . . .

Does that mean we should rule out war? No. But it does mean that we must do it right. To begin with, the president must level with the American people that we may indeed be buying the Arab Yugoslavia, which will take a great deal of time and effort to heal into a self-sustaining, progressive, accountable Arab government. And, therefore, any nation-building in Iraq will be a multiyear marathon, not a multiweek sprint.

Because it will be a marathon, we must undertake this war with the maximum amount of international legitimacy and U.N. backing we can possibly muster. Otherwise we will not have an American public willing to run this marathon, and we will not have allies ready to help us once we're inside (look at all the local police and administrators Europeans now contribute in Bosnia and Kosovo). We'll also become a huge target if we're the sole occupiers of Iraq.

In short, we can oust Saddam Hussein all by ourselves. But we cannot successfully rebuild Iraq all by ourselves. And the real prize here is a new Iraq that would be a progressive model for the whole region. That, for me, is the only morally and strategically justifiable reason to support this war. The Bush team dare not invade Iraq simply to install a more friendly dictator to pump us oil. And it dare not simply disarm Iraq and then walk away from the nation-building task.

Unfortunately, when it comes to enlisting allies, the Bush team is its own worst enemy. It has sneered at many issues the world cares about: the Kyoto accords, the World Court, arms control treaties. The Bush team had legitimate arguments on some of these issues, but the gratuitous way it dismissed them has fueled anti-Americanism. No, I have no illusions that if the Bush team had only embraced Kyoto the French wouldn't still be trying to obstruct America in Iraq. The French are the French. But unfortunately, now the Germans are the French, the Koreans are the French, and many Brits are becoming French.

Things could be better, but here is where we are -- so here is where I am: My gut tells me we should continue the troop buildup, continue the inspections and do everything we can for as long as we can to produce either a coup or the sort of evidence that will give us the broadest coalition possible, so we can do the best nation-building job possible.

But if war turns out to be the only option, then war it will have to be -- because I believe that our kids will have a better chance of growing up in a safer world if we help put Iraq on a more progressive path and stimulate some real change in an Arab world that is badly in need of reform. Such a war would indeed be a shock to this region, but, if we do it right, there is a decent chance that it would be shock therapy.

February 2, 2003

So pardon me if I don't take seriously all the Euro-whining about the Bush policies toward Iraq -- for one very simple reason: It strikes me as deeply unserious. It's not that there are no serious arguments to be made against war in Iraq. There are plenty. It's just that so much of what one hears coming from German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac are not serious arguments. They are station identification.

They are not the arguments of people who have really gotten beyond the distorted Arab press and tapped into what young Arabs are saying about their aspirations for democracy and how much they blame Saddam Hussein and his ilk for the poor state of their region. Rather, they are the diplomatic equivalent of smoking cancerous cigarettes while rejecting harmless G.M.O.'s -- an assertion of identity by trying to be whatever the Americans are not, regardless of the real interests or stakes.

And where this comes from, alas, is weakness.

February 9, 2003

Sometimes I wish that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council could be chosen like the starting five for the N.B.A. All-Star team -- with a vote by the fans. If so, I would certainly vote France off the Council and replace it with India. . . . France is so caught up with its need to differentiate itself from America to feel important, it's become silly.

February 5, 2003

I am not worried about ''the Arab street.'' Anyone who has walked there lately knows Saddam Hussein has very little support, and as long as a war to oust him does little harm to Iraqi civilians, it will be publicly tolerated and privately celebrated by many Arabs. . . .

This war has two purposes -- one stated, one unstated -- but both require the same means. The stated purpose is to disarm Iraq. The unstated purpose is to transform it from a totalitarian system that has threatened its neighbors and its own people into something better. It won't be a perfect democratic state. That will take years. But it can be a more decent state -- one that doesn't threaten its own people or neighbors. And it can serve as a progressive model to spur reform -- educational, religious, economic and political -- around the Arab world. This is the audacious part. . . .

That is why helping the Arab-Muslim world get onto a different course is the only meaningful response to 9/11. But it is a long-term, difficult, risky, costly, audacious project. It is one that will require a real nation-building commitment, and a real effort to stabilize the region by simultaneously promoting a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Is the Bush team up for all that? Is the nation up for all that? I'm not sure.

February 5, 2003

In talking with Bush administration officials of late I am struck by an incredible contrast. It is the contrast between the breathtaking audacity of what they intend to do in Iraq -- an audacity that, I must say, has an appeal for me -- and the incredibly narrow base of support that exists in America today for this audacious project. They are gearing up for the rebuilding of Iraq, along the lines of the rebuilding of Germany and Japan after World War II, and the nation is geared up, at best, for the quick and dirty invasion of Grenada. . . .

I don't care what the polls say, this is the real mood. Now, truth be told, I think I get this war, and, on balance, I think it is a risk worth taking -- provided we have a country willing to see it through. But it is time the president leveled with the country -- not just about the dangers posed by Saddam, but about the long-term costs involved in ousting him and rebuilding Iraq. This is not going to be Grenada.

December 8, 2002

I am worried. And you should be, too.

I am not against war in Iraq, if need be, but I am against going to war without preparing the ground in America, in the region and in the world at large to deal with the blowback any U.S. invasion will produce.

But I see few signs that President Bush is making those preparations. The Bush team's whole approach was best summed up by a friend of mine: ''We're at war -- let's party.'' We're at war -- let's not ask the American people to do anything hard.

March 19, 2003 (4 days before the invasion)

This column has argued throughout this debate that removing Saddam Hussein and helping Iraq replace his regime with a decent, accountable government that can serve as a model in the Middle East is worth doing -- not because Iraq threatens us with its weapons, but because we are threatened by a collection of failing Arab-Muslim states, which churn out way too many young people who feel humiliated, voiceless and left behind. We have a real interest in partnering with them for change.

This column has also argued, though, that such a preventive war is so unprecedented and mammoth a task -- taking over an entire country from a standing start and rebuilding it -- that it had to be done with maximum U.N legitimacy and with as many allies as possible. President Bush has failed to build that framework before going to war.

Though the Bush team came to office with this Iraq project in mind, it has pursued a narrow, ideological and bullying foreign policy that has alienated so many people that by the time it wanted to rustle up a posse for an Iraq war, too many nations were suspicious of its motives. But here we are, going to war, basically alone, in the face of opposition, not so much from ''the Arab Street,'' but from ''the World Street.''

Everyone wishes it were different, but it's too late -- which is why this column will henceforth focus on how to turn these lemons into lemonade. Our children's future hinges on doing this right, even if we got here wrong. To maximize our chances of doing that, we need to patch things up with the world. Because having more allied support in rebuilding Iraq will increase the odds that we do it right, and because if the breach that has been opened between us and our traditional friends hardens into hostility, we will find it much tougher to manage both Iraq and all the other threats down the road.


March 23, 2003 (day of the invasion)

Indeed, the French argue that only bad things will come from this war -- more terrorism, a dangerous precedent for preventive war, civilian casualties. The Bush team argues that this war will be a game-changer -- that it will spark reform throughout the Arab world and intimidate other tyrants who support terrorists.

Can this war produce more of what the Bush team expects than the Europeans predict? Yes, it can.

December 22, 2002

I believe Saddam will have one more exit opportunity, and the Bush team needs to be ready for it. I call it: ''the Primakov moment.''

Yevgeny Primakov was the Russian envoy and K.G.B. veteran who made several trips to Baghdad in 1990-91 to try to talk Saddam out of Kuwait to avoid a war -- 11th-hour diplomacy that drove the first Bush administration crazy. Saddam probably could have kept half of Kuwait had he played along with Mr. Primakov. But he wouldn't compromise and, in the end, got smashed. . . .

For all these reasons, the U.S. needs to be both cool and prepared for anything. We need to be cool and let the U.N. inspections process play out -- because we have such reluctant allies in this Gulf War II, we must not appear as overanxious warriors. We still need a smoking gun to justify a war, if we expect to have any allied support.

My guess is that we will see this play again. Before Gulf War II is launched, there will be a Russian-French or Arab delegation that flies to Baghdad and tries to persuade Saddam to spare his family, and everyone else, from a war -- either by disclosing his weapons or by going into exile under Arab or European protection.

March 2, 2003

And that leads to my dilemma. I have a mixed marriage. My wife opposes this war, but something in Mr. Bush's audacious shake of the dice appeals to me. He summed it up well in his speech last week: ''A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interest in security and America's belief in liberty both lead in the same direction -- to a free and peaceful Iraq.''

My dilemma is that while I believe in such a bold project, I fear that Mr. Bush has failed to create a context for his boldness to succeed, a context that could maximize support for his vision -- support vital to seeing it through. He and his team are the only people who would ever have conceived this project, but they may be the worst people to implement it. The only place they've been bold is in their military preparations (which have at least gotten Saddam to begin disarming). . . .

So here's how I feel: I feel as if the president is presenting us with a beautiful carved mahogany table -- a big, bold, gutsy vision. But if you look underneath, you discover that this table has only one leg. His bold vision on Iraq is not supported by boldness in other areas. And so I am terribly worried that Mr. Bush has told us the right thing to do, but won't be able to do it right.

March 5, 2003

And those, like myself, who have argued that removing Saddam is the right thing to do have to admit that the risks of doing so are rising so high, and the number of allies we have for the long haul becoming so few, that it may be impossible to do it right.

We could still get lucky and find that Mr. Bush's decision to begin this game of chicken by throwing away his steering wheel leads Saddam to cave or quit. The only other way out is a last attempt to forge a new U.N. resolution that would set specific disarmament targets for Saddam that, if not met by a specific date, would trigger U.N. approval for the use of force. France, Russia and China could say they bought time, and the U.S. could present Saddam with a united front -- which is the only threat that might get him to comply without a war.

Otherwise, brace yourself for the crash and hope for the best -- because we're all in the back seat.

March 9,2003

Fact: The invasion of Iraq today is not vital to American security. Saddam Hussein has neither the intention nor the capability to threaten America, and is easily deterrable if he did. This is not a war of necessity. That was Afghanistan. Iraq is a war of choice -- a legitimate choice to preserve the credibility of the U.N., which Saddam has defied for 12 years, and to destroy his tyranny and replace it with a decent regime that could drive reform in the Arab/Muslim world. That's the real case. . .

So here's where we are. Regime change in Iraq is the right choice for Iraq, for the Middle East and for the world. Mr. Bush is right about that. But for now, this choice may be just too hard to sell. If the president can't make his war of choice the world's war of choice right now, we need to reconsider our options and our tactics. Because if Mr. Bush acts unilaterally, I fear America will not only lose the chance of building a decent Iraq, but something more important -- America's efficacy as the strategic and moral leader of the free world.

March 12, 2003

Saddam Hussein poses no direct threat to us today. But confronting him is a legitimate choice -- much more legitimate than knee-jerk liberals and pacifists think. Removing Saddam -- with his obsession to obtain weapons of mass destruction -- ending his tyranny and helping to nurture a more progressive Iraq that could spur reform across the Arab-Muslim world are the best long-term responses to bin Ladenism. Some things are true even if George Bush believes them.

Decemeber 22, 2002

Before Gulf War II is launched, there will be a Russian-French or Arab delegation that flies to Baghdad and tries to persuade Saddam to spare his family, and everyone else, from a war -- either by disclosing his weapons or by going into exile under Arab or European protection. . . .

For all these reasons, the U.S. needs to be both cool and prepared for anything. We need to be cool and let the U.N. inspections process play out -- because we have such reluctant allies in this Gulf War II, we must not appear as overanxious warriors. We still need a smoking gun to justify a war, if we expect to have any allied support.

January 5, 2003

And that leads to my second point. If we occupy Iraq and simply install a more pro-U.S. autocrat to run the Iraqi gas station (as we have in other Arab oil states), then this war partly for oil would also be immoral.

If, on the other hand, the Bush team, and the American people, prove willing to stay in Iraq and pay the full price, in money and manpower, needed to help Iraqis build a more progressive, democratizing Arab state -- one that would use its oil income for the benefit of all its people and serve as a model for its neighbors -- then a war partly over oil would be quite legitimate. It would be a critical step toward building a better Middle East.

November 27, 2002 (writing in Bush's "voice" to Muslims)

Friends, unless you have a war within your civilization, there is going to be a war between our civilizations. We're just one more 9/11 away from that. So let's dedicate this next year to fighting intolerance within so we can preserve our relations between.

January 22, 2003

Although President Bush has cast the war in Iraq as being about disarmament -- and that is legitimate -- disarmament is not the most important prize there.